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Abstract
This paper suggests a new explanation for the low level of annuitization, which is valid
even if one assumes perfect markets. We show that, as soon there exists a positive bequest
motive, suﬃciently risk averse individuals should not purchase annuities. A model calibration
accounting for lifetime risk aversion generates a willingness-to-pay for annuities, which is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the one generated by a standard Yaari (1965) model. Moreover,
the calibration predicts that riskless savings ﬁnances one third of consumption, in line with
empirical ﬁndings.
Keywords: annuity puzzle, insurance demand, bequest, intergenerational transfers, life-
time risk aversion, multiplicative preferences.
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1 Introduction
Among the greatest risks in life is that associated with life duration. A recently retired American
man of age 65 has a life expectancy of about 17.5 years. Though, there is a more than 22% chance
that he will die within the ﬁrst 10 years and a more than 20% chance that he will live more than
25 years. Savings required to sustain 10 or 25 years of retirement vary considerably, and one
would expect a strong demand for annuities, which are ﬁnancial securities designed to deal with
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1lifetime uncertainty. A number of papers have stressed the utility gains that would be generated
by the annuitization of wealth at retirement. It is generally estimated that individuals would be
willing to give up to 25% of their wealth at retirement to gain access to a perfect annuity market
(see Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) among others). According to standard
theoretical predictions, even when individuals have a bequest motive, they should fully annuitize
the expected value of their future consumption. However, puzzlingly enough, empirical evidence
consistently shows that individuals purchase very few private annuities, in sharp contradiction
with the theoretical predictions. For example, Johnson, Burman, and Kobes (2004) report than
in the US, private annuities ﬁnance less than 1% of household income for people older than 65.1
Similarly, they also observe that private annuities are only purchased by 5% of people older than
65. James and Song (2001) ﬁnd similar results for other countries, such as Canada, the United
Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Israel, Chile and Singapore.
A number of explanations to this puzzle have been suggested, relying on market imperfections
or rationality biases.2 For example, due to imperfect health insurance, individuals would need
to store a substantial amount of liquidities; unfair annuity pricing would make them unattractive
assets; or framing eﬀects would play an important role in agents’ decisions to annuitize.
In this paper we emphasize that, even if the annuity market were perfect, a low (or even zero)
level of annuitization can be fully rational. Our explanation relies on the role of risk aversion.
We show that a high level of risk aversion together with a positive bequest motive is suﬃcient to
predict a negative demand for annuities. Even if the role of risk aversion has not been studied
in isolation, the intuition that annuities are perceived as a risky gamble has ﬁrst been evoked by
Brown (2007) and Brown, Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008), who emphasized the perceived
riskiness of annuities.
The reason why the eﬀect of risk aversion has remained unexplored is that the literature has
mainly focused on time additively separable preferences, or on Epstein and Zin speciﬁcation, while
both models are unadapted to study the role of risk aversion (See Bommier, Chassagnon, LeGrand
(2010), henceforth BCL). In the current paper, the role of risk aversion is investigated in the
expected utility framework, through the concaviﬁcation of the lifetime utility function as introduced
by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). We prove that the demand for annuities decreases with risk
aversion and eventually vanishes when risk aversion is large enough.
The fact that annuity demand decreases – and does not increase – with risk aversion might seem
counterintuitive. Insurance demand is generally found to increase with risk aversion. Though, this
1Roughly one half of income stems from public pensions, 17% from ﬁrm sponsored pension payments and one
third is ﬁnanced from savings.
2See Brown (2007), as well as the following section for a literature review.
2correlation does not hold anymore when irreplaceable commodities, such as life, are at risk. As was
explained by Cook and Graham (1977), rational insurance decisions aim at equalizing marginal
utilities of wealth across states of nature. With irreplaceable commodities, this may generate risk
taking behavior. Whenever this is the case, risk aversion should limit these risk taking behaviors
and reduce the demand for insurance.3
Annuities provide an example where purchasing insurance is risk increasing. Lifetime is un-
certain, but living long is generally considered to be a good outcome, while dying early is seen
to be a bad outcome. For a given amount of savings, purchasing annuities, rather than bonds
for example, involves reducing bequest in the case of an early death (i.e., a bad outcome), while
increasing consumption in case of survival (i.e., a good outcome). Thus, for a given level of savings,
annuities transfer resources from bad to good states of the world and are, as such, risk increasing.
If ﬁrst period consumption were exogenous and inter vivos transfers ruled out, simple dominance
arguments as in BCL would directly imply that the demand for annuity decreases with risk aver-
sion. In the current paper, the result is obtained with endogenous consumption smoothing and the
introduction of inter vivos transfers. Moreover, we prove that when risk aversion is large enough,
annuity demand eventually vanishes.
In order to evaluate to what extent risk aversion contributes to solving the annuity puzzle, we
calibrate a life-cycle model in which agents can invest in bonds and annuities. Calibrating risk
aversion and bequest motives to plausible levels shows that risk aversion alone does not generate
a negative demand for annuities. However, we obtain considerably smaller willingnesses-to-pay
for annuities than those obtained with the standard Yaari model, indicating that risk aversion
may indeed be an important factor to explain the low levels of annuitization. Our calibration
implies that one third of the agents’ consumption is ﬁnanced by riskless savings, which is in line
with empirical ﬁndings of Johnson, Burman, and Kobes (2004). This contrasts with the standard
Yaari’s model in which riskless savings do not contribute at all to consumption ﬁnancing, even if
agents have bequest motives.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related
literature. We then present a two-period model and derive our theoretical predictions in Section 3.
In Section 4, the model is extended to an N-period setting and calibrated. Numerical simulations
then derive the optimal life-cycle strategy of agents facing realistic mortality rates. Section 5
concludes.
3This was also noticed by Drèze and Rustichini (2004), who provide an example where insurance demand may
decrease with risk aversion (see their Proposition 9.1.).
32 Related literature
The microeconomic literature on annuity was initiated by Yaari’s (1965) seminal contribution,
which was the ﬁrst model of intertemporal choice with lifetime uncertainty. Yaari explains that,
in absence of a bequest motive, purchasing annuities increases individual welfare. Such a result
is extremely robust. Even if annuity contracts are not fairly priced, they allow agents to increase
lifetime consumption by lowering the amount of undesired bequest. Agents, who do not care for
bequest but value consumption should invest all their wealth in annuities.4 Full wealth annuiti-
zation is no longer optimal when bequest motives are introduced. However, Davidoﬀ, Brown and
Diamond (2005) as well as Lockwood (2010) prove that the optimal behavior consists in annuitizing
the discounted value of all future consumptions. The low level of observed annuitization was then
identiﬁed as a puzzle, for which diﬀerent explanations were suggested.
One possible explanation is that inadequate insurance products such as health or long term
care insurance for example, may encourage people to save a large amount of liquid assets. The-
oretically speaking, annuities do not have to be illiquid, but allowing people to sell them back
could magnify adverse selection issues. A market for reversible annuities may thus be diﬃcult to
develop. In absence of such a market, the optimal strategy while facing uninsurable risks may then
involve investing wealth in buﬀer assets, such as bonds or stock rather than in annuities. Sinclair
and Smetters (2004), Yogo (2009), Pang and Warshawsky (2010) among others emphasize this
explanation.
Another explanation is related to unfair pricing of annuities, as reported by Mitchell, Poterba,
Warshawsky and Brown (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and (2004). Lockwood (2010)
demonstrates that this aspect, together with bequest motives of a reasonable magnitude, may be
suﬃcient to explain the low level of annuitization.
A related channel is the fact that annuities diminish individuals’ investment opportunity sets
by preventing savings in high return and high risk assets. Milevsky and Young (2007) and Horneﬀ,
Maurer, Mitchell and Stamos (2010) prove that a low level of annuitization results from allowing
individuals to trade stocks in addition to standard bonds and annuities. They therefore argue that
the annuity puzzle stems from the lack of annuities backed by high-risk and high-return assets.
One may however wonder why such a market has not developed yet.
Last, behavioral economics provide a whole range of explanations. For example Brown, Kling,
Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008) emphasize that framing eﬀects could be at the origin of the low
demand for annuities.5 Brown (2007) reviews other behavioral hypotheses, such as loss aversion,
4See corollary 1 in Davidoﬀ, Brown and Diamond (2005).
5Framing eﬀects describe the fact that individuals’ choices may depend on the formulation of alternatives and in
particular if they are focused on gains or losses.
4regret aversion, ﬁnancial illiteracy or the illusion of control.
Interestingly enough, papers discussing these behavioral aspects also underline the role of annu-
ities’ riskiness. In particular Brown, Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008) explain that “annuities
appear riskier than the bond”, since purchasing annuities generates a substantial loss in case of
an early death. The eﬀect of the loss aversion has also been pointed out by Hu and Scott (2007).
Similarly, Brown (2007) explains that agents seem to be willing to purchase insurance that pays
oﬀ well in case of bad events, while annuities pay in case of good events (i.e., survival). Agnew,
Anderson, Gerlach and Szykman (2008) conﬁrm through lab experiments the importance of an-
nuity riskiness perception.6 The role of framing is also highlighted by Benartzi, Previtero, and
Thaler (2011), who state that “while economists tend naturally to think about annuitization as a
risk-reducing strategy like the purchase of insurance, many consumers may not share this point of
view”. These statements seem to indicate that agents are extremely sensitive to the riskiness of
annuities, and that risk aversion may therefore play a signiﬁcant role.
The role of risk aversion, although mentioned in several papers, has not hitherto been formal-
ized. The reason is that most papers use Yaari’s approach, based on an assumption of additive
separability of preferences, which nests together preferences under uncertainty (risk aversion) and
ordinal preferences (intertemporal elasticity of substitution). As underlined in many papers (e.g.,
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and Epstein and Zin (1989)), the additive framework is ill-suited for
the analysis of the role of risk aversion. It is indeed impossible to disentangle aspects of preferences
over certain outcomes from the ones related to risky gambles.
A few papers on annuities focus on Epstein and Zin’s (1989) approach to disentangle risk
aversion from the elasticity of substitution.7 However, as shown in BCL, Epstein and Zin utility
functions are not well ordered in terms of risk aversion. This generates surprising results when
studying the relation between risk aversion and saving choices. For example, in a simple two-
period model, simple dominance arguments developed in BCL indicate that precautionary savings
rise with risk aversion.8 The same conclusion is drawn when considering well ordered speciﬁcations
based on expected utility or on rank dependent expected utility (see Drèze and Modigliani (1972),
Yaari (1987), or Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2005) among others). On the contrary, Kimball and
Weil (2009) prove that this relation is ambiguous for Epstein and Zin’s preferences.
A simple and somewhat robust way to study risk aversion involves remaining within the ex-
pected utility framework and increasing the concavity of the lifetime – and not instantaneous –
6Gazzale and Walker (2011) reach a similar conclusion using neutral-context laboratory experiments.
7See for example Ponzetto (2003), Inkmann, Lopes and Michaelides (2009) and Horneﬀ, Maurer and Stamos
(2010).
8Precautionary savings can be deﬁned as the optimal amount of saving due to the uncertainty of the second-period
income.
5utility function, as initially suggested by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974). This approach has been
notably followed by Van der Ploeg (1993), Eden (2008), and Van den Heuvel (2008). In the case
of choice with lifetime uncertainty, this approach was ﬁrst used in Bommier (2006) and leads to
novel predictions on a number of topics, including on the relation between time discounting and
risk aversion, the impact of mortality change and the value of life. In particular, as highlighted
in BCL, these preferences are well ordered in terms of risk aversion and deliver meaningful results
when studying intertemproal choice problems. They also contribute to generate realistic lifecycle
consumption proﬁles (Bommier (2011)). In the present paper we consider such an approach in a
framework accounting for bequests and inter vivos transfers.
3 The model
3.1 Description
The economy is populated by a single agent, who cares for someone else. This heir is not modeled
and does not formally belong to the economy. His single attribute is to accept transfers (inter vivos
ones or bequests). The economy is aﬀected by a mortality risk. The agent may live for one period
with probability 1 − p or for two periods with probability p ∈ (0,1).
We assume that the agent can transfer consumption from the ﬁrst period to the second one,
either through an annuity or bond savings. The annuity market is supposed to be perfectly fair
and the bond market pays oﬀ an exogenous riskless gross rate of return 1+R. Investing one unit of
consumption in riskless savings in period 1 returns 1+R consumption units in the second period,
while the same investment in annuity produces 1+R
p second period consumption units.9
The agent is endowed with an initial constant wealth W0 and has no other source of income.
In the ﬁrst period, the agent consumes c1 out of his wealth. He is left with wealth W0 −c1 that he
allocates either to annuities a, or savings s. In the second period, the agent faces two alternatives.
First, with probability 1−p, the agent dies and his capitalized savings (1+R)s are left to his heir,
while his annuities are completely lost, for both the agent and his heir. Second, with probability
p, the agent survives and in the second period, he enjoys the beneﬁts from his riskless saving and
his annuity payment, which total amount is equal to (1+R)s+ 1+R
p a. Out of this sum, the agent
consumes c2 and hands down the remaining money to his heir through an inter vivos transfer.
9Since the economy is aﬀected by the sole mortality risk, the asset market is complete with the riskless asset and
the annuity (up to non-borrowing constraints which do not bind too often in the calibrated version of the model –
see Section 4). As such, other assets, such as life insurance, are redundant.
63.2 Preferences
Given our previous description, the economy is ex post described by only three variables: the ﬁrst
period consumption c1, the second period agent’s status x2 (i.e., dead or alive, and if he is alive
how much he consumes), and the amount of money τ left to the heirs, through either bequests or
inter vivos transfers. Modeling agents’ behavior involves comparing lotteries whose consequences
are the previous triplet (c1,x2,τ) ∈ R+ × (R+ ∪ {d}) × R+ where d denotes the death state. We
constrain consumption, as well as savings and intergenerational transfers to be non-negative. The
idea is that an agent cannot force his heir to give him money, or to accept a negative bequest.
The agent enjoys felicity u1 from the ﬁrst period consumption, felicity u2 from his second period
status and felicity v from the transfer to his heir. The agent is assumed to be an expected utility
maximizer with the following utility index deﬁned over the set of consequences R+×(R+∪{d})×R+:
U(c1,x2,τ1) = φ(u1(c1) + u2(x2) + v(τ)).
The function φ, which makes the link between lifetime felicity and utility, governs risk aversion.
This transformation does not modify ordinal preferences and consequently has no impact in de-
terministic environments. As shown by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), augmenting the concavity
of the function φ provides the standard (and only) way to discuss the role of risk aversion while
remaining in the expected utility framework. Such an approach has received little attention be-
cause it was thought to lead to time inconsistencies, or to history dependent preferences. Bommier
(2011) showed however that the framework of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) is not incompatible
with the assumption of preference stationarity, at the condition to use an exponential functional
form for φ – as we will do later on.
Most of the applied literature on intertemporal choice has focused on the special case of a linear
transformation φ and has associated the words “risk aversion” to measures of the curvature of the
functions u1, u2 and v. This is a rather unfortunate terminology as agents with diﬀerent functions
u1 and u2 and v cannot be compared in terms of risk aversion, since they do not have the same
preferences over certain outcomes (see for example the discussion in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974)
or in Epstein and Zin (1989)). A sounder terminology would consist in using the words “elasticity
of substitution” when commenting on the curvature of the functions u1, u2 and v, and to keep the
expression risk aversion to discuss properties of the function φ . We will adhere to that terminology.
However, to insist on the diﬀerence between our terminology and the usual (but inappropriate) one,
we introduce the term “lifetime” before any mention of the words risk aversion. In short, what we
call “lifetime risk aversion” is what should have been called “risk aversion” and is exclusively related
to the curvature of the function φ. In order to further help the reader to take some distance with
the usual additive model, we moreover use the terms “felicity” when mentioning the functions u1, u2
7and v, and keep the term “utility” for the function U(c1,x2,τ1) = φ(u1(c1) + u2(x2) + v(τ)). The
usual approach assumes that (lifetime) utility is additive in felicity (i.e., that the transformation
φ is linear), which involves making a very strong assumption of risk neutrality with respect to
lifetime felicity (Bommier (2006)). A salient feature of our paper is that we extend the analysis to
a non-linear φ, thus allowing the role of (lifetime) risk aversion to be investigated.
Without loss of generality, we normalize felicity functions as follows. First, the second period
felicity when dead is normalized to 0: u2(d) = 0. Second, leaving nothing to his heir also provides
v(0) = 0. Finally, the function φ is normalized with φ
0(0) = 1. We also assume that all functions
are regular and more precisely: (i) u1, the restriction of u2 to R+, and v are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave and (ii) φ is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
increasing. Moreover, in order to always obtain strictly positive consumption levels, we assume that




Regarding the second period felicity u2, we also assume that there exist second period con-
sumption levels such that u2(c2) > 0 = u2(d). This means that for some levels of second period
consumption, the agents prefers life to death. We denote c∗
2 the minimum level of second period
consumption that makes life preferable to death. Formally:
c∗
2 = inf{c2 > 0|u2(c2) > 0}. (1)
With some speciﬁcations, we have c∗
2 = 0, which means that life is preferable to death no matter the
level of consumption. But with other speciﬁcations (e.g., when assuming isoelastic instantaneous
felicity, with an elasticity smaller than one), this minimal level c∗
2 is strictly positive. In that case,
if the agent does not enjoy a suﬃcient second period consumption, he would prefer to die rather
than remain alive.
The function v measures to what extent transfers to heirs and bequests are valuated by the
agent. This is a shortcut for taking into account the agent’s altruism, and measuring how the agent
cares for his heir. Such a modeling choice for bequests has already been made in the literature,
for example by Hurd and Smith (2002), De Nardi (2004), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), De Nardi,
French and Jones (2010), Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011), Lockwood (2010)
and (2011).
3.3 Agent’s program
The agent’s program is:
max
c1,a,s,c2
pφ(u1(c1) + u2(c2) + v(τ)) + (1 − p)φ(u1(c1) + v((1 + R)s)), (2)
8subject to the following constraints:
c1 + a + s = W0, (3)




c1 > 0, c2 > 0, τ ≥ 0, a ≥ 0, s ≥ 0. (5)
Equation (2) is the agent’s expected utility. With probability p, he lives for two periods and
consumes successively c1 and c2 and hands down τ to his heirs. Otherwise, he only lives for one
period and his savings in the riskless bonds are left to his heir as a bequest. Equations (3) and
(4) are the budget constraints of the ﬁrst and second periods. Finally, conditions in (5) state
that consumption has to be strictly positive and transfers, savings and annuity holdings cannot be
negative. The agent is therefore not permitted to hand down a debt to his heirs or take resources
from them. Moreover, the agent is prevented from issuing annuities.
When deriving the ﬁrst order conditions from the agent’s program, we need to account for the
possibility of binding constraints for τ, s and a. Let us denote by UD and UA the lifetime felicity
obtained when the agent lives for one or two periods:
UD = u1(c1) + v((1 + R)s),
UA = u1(c1) + u2(c2) + v(τ).
The ﬁrst order conditions from the agent’s program (2)–(5) are:
 
pφ




1(c1) = µ1, (6)
pφ
0(UA)u0





















≤ 0 (= 0 if s > 0), (9)
pv0(τ)φ
0(UA) − µ2 ≤ 0 (= 0 if τ > 0). (10)
Equations (8) to (10) are inequalities, as the optimal values for a, s and τ may correspond to
corner solutions. These inequalities become equalities whenever interior solutions are obtained.
3.4 Saving choices
We ﬁrst consider the case where the function φ is linear, as it is usually assumed to be. The results
obtained in that case are well known and are discussed in Davidoﬀ, Brown and Diamond (2005),
and Lockwood (2010), for example. We formalize these ﬁndings in our setup to contrast them later
on with results derived when the function φ is no longer assumed to be linear.
9Proposition 1 (Annuity and saving with linear φ) If φ is linear, then the amounts invested
in annuities equals the present value of the second period consumption. All that is invested in bonds




and (1 + R)s = τ.
Proof.
The proof can be found in the appendix and relies on the analysis of equations (8)–(10), in the




The above proposition shows that, when φ is linear, people should purchase an amount of
annuities that will exactly ﬁnance their future consumption. Intergenerational transfers, which
materialize either through bequest or inter vivos transfers, are independent of life duration. Riskless
savings only help to ﬁnance the bequest, but do not contribute at all to ﬁnancing consumption, no
matter the strength of the bequest motive.
We now consider the case when the agent’s preferences exhibit positive lifetime risk aversion,
i.e. the case of a concave function φ.
Proposition 2 (Optimal annuitization with a concave φ) If φ is concave and c2 > c∗
2 at the
optimum (i.e., the agent prefers to survive), then:
– either savings and bequest are null: s = τ = 0,
– or capitalized savings are larger than inter vivos transfers and the annuities do not fully
ﬁnance second period consumption:




Proof. Let us ﬁrst remark that c2 > c∗
2 implies u2(c2) > 0 and UA − UD > v(τ) − v((1 + R)s).




p . Suppose that τ > 0. We obtain from the previous inequality and
(10) as an equality that v0(0)φ
0(UD) ≤ v0(τ)φ
0(UA). Since UA − UD > 0 and φ is increasing
and concave, 0 < φ
0(UA) ≤ φ
0(UD) and thus v0(0) ≤ v0(τ), contradicting the fact that v is
concave and non-linear. We deduce therefore that s = τ = 0.
– s > 0. Suppose that (1 + R)s ≤ τ. It implies v(τ) − v((1 + R)s) ≥ 0 and UA − UD > 0.
Moreover, the budget constraint (4) implies a1+R
p = c2 + τ − (1 + R)s > 0. Eq.(8)–(10) are
equalities and yield:
φ








v0((1+R)s) ≤ 1 in contradiction with UD < UA and φ concave.




As soon as the agent is risk averse with respect to lifetime felicity, and willing to leave some
transfer or bequest, he should not completely annuitize his consumption. Riskless savings con-
tribute to ﬁnancing not only transfers to the heir but also the agent’s consumption. Transfers
received by the heirs will depend on life duration, shorter lives being associated with greater trans-
fers. The agent, who cannot eliminate the possibility of an early death, achieves some partial self
insurance by creating a negative correlation between two aspects he thinks desirable: living long
and transferring resources to his heir.
To establish further results about risk aversion and annuities, we need to make slightly stronger
assumptions regarding the willingness to live and to make transfers. More precisely, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption A Denote by c∗∗
2 = inf{c2|u2(c2) > v(c2)}. We assume that:











3. v0(0) < u0
2(c∗∗
2 ).
The consumption level c∗∗
2 is the smallest second period consumption level that makes the
agent’s life worthwhile, once accounting for the possibility of bequeathing to the heir. Below that
level of consumption, the agent would rather die and hand down all his wealth. The consumption
level c∗∗
2 is larger than c∗
2 deﬁned in Equation (1), which does not account for the possibility of
making intergenerational transfers. The three points of the above assumption can be interpreted
as follows. Point 1 simply states that any agent enjoying a second period consumption greater
than c∗∗
2 would prefer to live than to die and bequeathes all this consumption to his heirs. Point
2 means that the bequest motive is suﬃciently strong in the sense that if the agent was sure to
die after period 1, he would leave at least c∗∗
2 to his heirs. The last point states that the bequest
motive is not too strong, in the sense that the agent living at the second period and endowed with
the survival consumption level c∗∗
2 is not willing to make any inter vivos transfers.
We make a further assumption regarding the functional form of the concave transformation φ.
Assumption B The function φ is of CARA type: φ(x) = −e
−λ x
λ , where λ > 0.
11We specify the aggregator φ to have an exponential functional form, such that the resulting
preferences are multiplicative. The parameter λ drives the concavity of the aggregator, and there-
fore the degree of lifetime risk aversion. The larger the coeﬃcient λ, the more risk averse the
agent is. As underlined in Bommier (2011), multiplicative preferences allow to disentangle elas-
ticity of substitution from risk aversion while remaining in the expected utility framework and
retaining the assumption of stationarity. In consequence, choices resulting from these preferences
are time-consistent and history independent.10
We can now state the following result:
Proposition 3 (Decreasing and null annuity) Under Assumptions A and B, the optimal an-
nuity is a decreasing function of the lifetime risk aversion λ. Moreover, there exists λ0 > 0, such
that for all λ greater than λ0, the optimal annuity purchase is null.
Proof. The proof is relegated to the Appendix. Due to multiple combinations of non-interior
solutions, the proof implies distinguishing a number of cases.
Under Assumptions A and B, we are able to derives two forceful conclusions concerning annuity
demand. First, the annuity demand is decreasing with lifetime risk aversion. More risk averse
agents prefer to purchase less annuities. They are more reluctant to take the risk of dying young
without leaving a signiﬁcant amount of bequest. Moreover, the demand for annuity not only
diminishes with lifetime risk aversion but also vanishes for suﬃciently large levels of lifetime risk
aversion. Accounting for lifetime risk aversion may then provide an explanation for the annuity
puzzle that holds even if assuming a perfect annuity market.
4 A calibrated model
In this section, we extend our model to a large number of retirement periods so as to calibrate
it using realistic mortality patterns and preference parameters and make predictions relating to
agents’ savings behavior. The section is split into four parts. The ﬁrst one details the structure
of the extended model, and the method to solve it. We also explain how the model compares to
the standard additive model, which is considered as a benchmark. The second part describes how
both the additive and the multiplicative models are calibrated. The third part provides the results
derived from the calibrated models, while the last one proceeds with a sensitivity analysis.
10The issues of time inconsistency and history independence do not arise in the two-period framework that is
considered in the current Section. However they would do so in the N-period extension considered in Section 4.
124.1 The N–period model extension
4.1.1 The setting
We extend our setup to N periods. As with the two period model, we normalize the retirement
date to the date 0 of the model. Mortality remains the sole risk faced by the agent and pt+1|t
denotes the probability of remaining alive at date t+1 while being alive at date t. Thus, 1−pt+1|t
denotes the probability of dying at the end of period t. The agent is alive at date 0, so that:
p0|−1 = 1. We denote by mt|0 (resp. pt|0) the probability of living exactly (resp. at least) until
date t. These probabilities relate to each other as follows:
mt|0 = (1 − pt+1|t)
t Y
k=1




pk|k−1 and p0|−1 = 1.
The agent is endowed with wealth W0 when he retires at date 0. In addition to his wealth,
he receives a constant periodic income y, while he is alive. This income can be interpreted as an
exogenous pension beneﬁt. In order to smooth resources over time and states of nature, we assume
that the agent can trade two kinds of ﬁnancial products: bonds and annuities. A bond is a security
of price 1 which pays 1+R in the subsequent period, either to the bond holder or, if he dies, to his
heirs. The riskless rate of interest R is constant and exogenous. An annuity is a ﬁnancial product,
which pays oﬀ one monetary unit every period following the purchase date, as long as the annuity
holder is alive. We assume that the annuity market is perfect, and that the pricing is actuarially
fair. This implies that the price πt of an annuity purchased at date t can be expressed as the









We assume that agents can sell back the annuities they hold at any time. However, they cannot
issue annuities and cannot therefore hold a negative amount of annuities. The number of annuities
purchased (or sold back at) age t is denoted at, while the number of bonds held is bt. As agents
cannot leave negative transfers, we impose that bt ≥ 0 for all t. From now on, we refer to the
income y as the public annuity, contrasting it with private annuities (at). We refer to the quantity
of bonds (bt) as being the riskless savings of the agent.
We do not explicitly introduce inter vivos transfers in this N-period setting as they would
be redundant with transfers made through bequest. Indeed, given that what will matter is the
present value of transfers, making an inter vivos transfer of δ at time t is equivalent to changing
bτ to bτ + δ(1 + R)τ−t at all periods τ ≥ t.
134.1.2 The multiplicative speciﬁcation
As for the two period model, we assume that preferences are weakly separable, but we allow
for lifetime risk aversion. The agent cares for the present value of the bequest he hands down
to his heirs. Precisely, we assume that leaving an amount of bequest wt in period t provides
a felicity v( wt
(1+R)t). Thus, an agent who dies at time t and holds bt bonds, leaves a bequest
wt+1 = (1+R)bt. The heir receives that amount in period t+1, which provides the agent a felicity
v( bt
(1+R)t). Therefore, living for t periods, with a stream of consumption (ck)0≤k≤t, and a bond
















As in the previous section (Assumption B), we assume that the aggregator is exponential, where
λ > 0 drives the lifetime risk aversion. We call such a model the multiplicative model,11 so as to
contrast it with the standard additive model that will be precisely speciﬁed in Section 4.1.4.
The agent maximizes his expected intertemporal utility by choosing his consumption stream
(ct)t≥0, his bond saving (bt)t≥0 and annuity purchase (at)t≥0, subject to per period budget con-


















s.t. W0 + y = c0 + b0 + π0 a0, (13)
y + (1 + R)bt−1 +
t−1 X
k=0
ak = ct + bt + πt at for t ≥ 1, (14)
ct ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0,
t X
k=0
ak ≥ 0. (15)
It is noteworthy that there is no exogenous time discounting in this model. Time discounting
is endogenous and stems from the combination of mortality risk and lifetime risk aversion (see
Bommier (2006) or Equation (29) later on).










where the multiplicative structure is explicit.















 = µt, (16)
mt|0















= µt − (1 + R)µt+1 (17)




µk (the equality becomes ≥ if
t X
k=0
ak = 0). (18)
In the previous equations, the parameter µt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint
of date t, or the shadow cost of unit of extra consumption at date t. Since Equation (18) also means
that µt πt = µt+1(1 + πt+1), we obtain the following intertemporal relationship for the Lagrange
multiplier µ:
pt+1|t µt = µt+1(1 + R) if
t X
k=0
ak > 0. (19)
Equation (19) states that the shadow cost of the budget constraint at date t+1 is equal to the
discounted shadow cost of date t, where the discount takes the probability of dying into account.
From now on, we assume that there exists TM < ∞, such the probability of remaining alive





























ak > 0, (20)
=
mt|0






















if bt > 0. (21)
The ﬁrst intertemporal Euler equation (20) is valid for every date t between 0 and TM − 1. It
sets as being equal the marginal cost of saving one unit of good today to the marginal cost of
consuming one unit more tomorrow. The second Euler equation (21) is true for all dates t between
0 and TM and equalizes the marginal cost of saving one unit more today to the marginal beneﬁt














if both riskless savings and stock of annuities are
strictly positive.
154.1.3 Implementation
In order to solve the model, we take advantage of the choice of an exponential function φ which
provides a recursive structure to the agent’s utility function. As a consequence, the ﬁrst order
conditions (20) and (21) of date t are independent of any past variables and a backward algorithm
can be readily implemented. We start from a guess for the ﬁnal value of consumption cTM at date
TM. The backward resolution of the model then yields a unique wealth endowment, compatible
with that terminal of level cTM. We then search for the value of cTM such that the associated
wealth endowment corresponds to the desired initial wealth W0.
4.1.4 Additive speciﬁcation
In order to highlight the role of lifetime risk aversion, we consider a benchmark model, in which
the intertemporal utility of the agent is a sum of discounted instantaneous felicities. The discount
parameter β > 0 represents the agent’s exogenous time preference. This model is very similar to
those of De Nardi (2004), De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), Lockwood (2010) and (2011), and
Ameriks and al. (2011). More precisely, using the same notations as before, the agent’s program












s.t. W0 + y = c0 + b0 + π0 a0, (23)
y + (1 + R)bt−1 +
t−1 X
k=0
ak = ct + bt + πt at for t ≥ 1, (24)
ct ≥ 0, bt ≥ 0,
t X
k=0
ak ≥ 0. (25)
In contradistinction to the previous multiplicative model, we refer to this model as the additive
model.
The agent’s program yields the following ﬁrst order conditions:
u0(ct) = β(1 + R)u0(ct+1) if
t X
k=0
ak ≥ 0, (26)
u0(ct) − pt+1|tβ(1 + R)u0(ct+1) =
1 − pt+1|t





if bt ≥ 0. (27)
It is noteworthy that provided we have interior solutions, the amount of discounted savings
bt













. From these equalities, it is
straightforward to deduce that bt
(1+R)t =
bt+1
(1+R)t+1 as long as we have an interior solution. The
16discounted value of saving is constant over age. This means that the heir enjoys a bequest whose
present value is independent of his parents’ life duration. As a result, riskless saving only aims at
leaving bequest, while private annuities fully ﬁnance consumption. The agent’s budget constraint
at any date t can be simpliﬁed to y +
Pt−1
k=0 ak = ct + πt at, in which the bond saving quantity
does not intervene. In consequence, in the additive model, saving in riskless bonds and purchasing
private annuities are two independent decisions, which fulﬁll two independent purposes. This is
not the case in the multiplicative model, where private annuities and riskless savings are nested
decisions, which both contribute to ﬁnance consumption.
4.2 Calibration
We need to calibrate both the multiplicative and the additive models. First of all, we specify our
felicity functions u and v. We assume that the agent has a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, which means that −
u
0(c)
cu00(c) is constant, or equivalently that:




where the parameter σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and u0 a
constant. Since u is normalized by a zero felicity for death (u(d) = 0), we cannot impose u0 to be
equal to zero. This constant u0 determines how wide is the felicity gap between being alive and
death, and will have impact on the optimal consumption and saving plans in the multiplicative
model.










This functional expression represents a kind of altruism, and accounts for the fact that bequest
only comes in addition to other resources the heirs may dispose of. The parameter θ drives the
intensity of altruism. With y0 > 0, bequests are a luxury good, as reported in the data (e.g., in
Hurd and Smith (2002)). Moreover, the value v0(0) is ﬁnite, so that agents bequeath only when
their wealth is large enough. This functional form has been chosen for example in De Nardi (2004),
De Nardi et al. (2010), Lockwood (2010) and (2011) and Ameriks et al. (2011).
Regarding our calibration, we proceed in two ways: (i) we ﬁx exogenously some parameters to
values that seem reasonable and (ii) we choose some parameter values to match given quantities,
as the endogenous rate of time discounting, the value of a statistical life and the average bequest.
174.2.1 Exogenous calibration.
First of all, we normalize date 0 of the model as corresponding to the age of 65, assuming that
people retire at that age. Mortality data are US 2000 mortality data from the Human Mortality
Database. In the data, the maximal age is 110 years. People alive at the age of 65 will live at most
for 45 years. This implies that TM = 45 and p46|45 = 0.
We posit the exogenous rate of return of savings to be equal to 3.00%, which is close to the
historical value of the riskless short term interest rate proxied by the three-month T-bond.
We also exogenously calibrate some preference parameters. First, for both functions u and
v, we adopt σ = 2 corresponding to a standard value of 1/2 for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Second, for the parameters y0 and ψ entering the function v, we follow Lockwood’s
(2010) approach. The idea is that y0 + w






is proportional to his lifetime utility. For this, y0 is set equal to the periodic
income y and ψ is interpreted as an actualization parameter which would reﬂect how bequest may
impact consumption. In order to take a plausible value for ψ, we consider that the agent’s heir
fully annuitizes the bequest. In the model, the agent retires at the age of 65 where life expectancy
is about 18 years. The coeﬃcient ψ must therefore take into account the fact that the real bequest
at the age of 65 needs to be capitalized for 18 years on average. Assuming that the age diﬀerence
between parents and children is approximately 27, the discount factor ψ reﬂects the value of an
annuity at the age of 56.12 We deduce that ψ = π56
(1+R)18 = 9.39 where π56 is the value of an annuity
at the age of 56.





(1+R)k y is set equal to W0. The quantity N can also be interpreted as the
agent’s wealth, which has already been annuitized. As in Lockwood (2010), the non-annuitized
wealth W0 is thus equal to one-half of total wealth.
4.2.2 Evaluated parameters
We still have to calibrate the following parameters: u0 driving the gap in felicity between being alive
and dead, the strength of bequest motive θ and the lifetime risk aversion λ (in the multiplicative
model) or the exogenous time discount β (in the additive model). The calibration aims to replicate
three “observable” quantities: the average bequest, the value of a statistical life (VSL) and the rate
of time discounting at the retirement age of 65 that we note ρ0. Before providing targets for these
quantities, we explain how they are deﬁned.
12See for example the report of Livingston and Cohn (2010) on American motherhood.












Rate of time discounting. Conventionally, the rate of time discounting ρ0 at the retirement











This quantity is interpreted as being the rate of change of marginal utility, in which we oﬀset the
consumption eﬀect. The relationship between the rate of discounting and the parameters depends
on the structure of the model. To avoid possible confusions, we use diﬀerent notations, respectively
ρmul
0 (for the multiplicative case) and ρadd
0 (for the additive model) when referring to the rate of
time discounting but using expressions relating to the structure of the model. Simple calculation



















Value of life. The value of a statistical life V SL0 at the retirement age can be expressed as the
opposite of the marginal rate of substitution between the mortality rate and consumption at that
age. Noting q1|0 = p
−1
1|0 − 1 the mortality rate at the retirement age, we deﬁne VSL as follows:






The quantity V SL0 corresponds to the quantity of consumption an agent would be willing to
relinquish to save one statistical life. Our deﬁnition of VSL is similar to Johansson’s (2002).
Again, although the notion of VSL is independent of the choice of one particular model, we
will introduce speciﬁc notations when working with speciﬁc models. Formulas providing V SL0 in
the multiplicative and additive cases are given by:
V SLmul
0 = p1|0




































Benchmark calibration. In the benchmark calibration, we consider the three following targets.
First, the average bequest is equal to 20% of the initial wealth W0. Second, the rate of time
19discounting at age 65 equals 5%. This rate of discount generates a consumption rate of growth of
−0.1% per year at the age of 65. A decrease in consumption is indeed reported in most studies
using micro-level data to assess the consumption proﬁle per age (Japelli (1999) and Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger (2007) among others). Third, the value of a statistical life at age 65 equals
500 times the annual consumption. This ﬁts in with the range of estimates provided in Viscusi
and Aldy (2003).
Our benchmark calibration is ﬁnally summed up in Table 1. We will investigate the sensitivity
of our ﬁndings to various values of calibration in the robustness section.
Calibration













u0 157.72 u0 315.84
λ 4.81 × 10−4 β 0.969
θ 4.523 θ 4.715
Table 1: Benchmark calibration
4.3 Results
Our results aim at discussing both the strength of the demand for annuities, and the role annuities
would play for consumption smoothing if markets were perfect. Before exposing our results in
details, we want to highlight that even in this extended set-up our main theoretical ﬁndings of
Proposition 3 still hold. In particular, the annuity demand still decreases with the risk aversion
parameter λ and is null (i.e. ak = 0 for all k) for a suﬃcient large λ.13
We expose our results in three steps. We ﬁrst investigate how much an individual would be
willing to pay to have access to a perfect annuity market. This is a standard way to measure
13Keeping unchanged the other parameters of our benchmark calibration (Table 1), we ﬁnd that people never
purchase annuities when λ is larger than 0.0133.
20the welfare impact of annuities. Second, we explain to what extent individuals would rely on
annuities to ﬁnance their consumption if annuities were available at fair prices. Last, we look at
the consequences in terms of consumption smoothing.
4.3.1 Willingness-to-pay for annuities
In order to measure the strength of demand for annuities, we compute the “willingness-to-pay for
annuities” (WTP, hereafter), which is deﬁned as the fraction of the non-annuitized wealth an agent
would be likely to relinquish to gain access to the private annuity market, rather than being in a
world where these annuities do not exist. In other words, an agent endowed with the non-annuitized
wealth Wna
0 and without access to an annuity market would be equally well oﬀ as an agent endowed
with the wealth W0 = (1−WTP)×Wna
0 but having access to a perfectly fair annuity market. The
larger WTP, the more valuable is the annuity market for the agent. This measure is conventional
in the literature, and was used for example by Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999)
or more recently by Lockwood (2010).
Multiplicative model Additive model
Target values used for calibration
Rate of time discounting ρ0 5.00%
Value of statistical life V SL 500 × c0
Average bequest w 20% × W0
Results
Willingness-to-pay WTP 1.22% 6.86%
Share of consumption ﬁnanced by:
Public annuities %c/y 56.42% 55.68%
Private annuities %c/a 9.46% 44.32%
Riskless savings %c/b 34.12% 0.00%
Table 2: Results for the benchmark calibration
The ﬁrst line in Table 2 shows the diﬀerence in WTP between the two models. In both cases,
the WTP is positive. The fact that we observe a positive WTP in the multiplicative model means
that with a reasonable calibration, lifetime risk aversion is not signiﬁcant enough to deliver the zero
annuity result of Proposition 3. The diﬀerence in prediction between the additive and multiplicative
models is however quite substantial. While the additive model predicts a WTP of 6.86%, it is more
than ﬁve times smaller with the multiplicative model, where the WTP is only 1.22%. Although,
both models were calibrated to provide the same average amount of bequest, the lack of annuity is
21less penalizing for agents with multiplicative preferences than for whose with additive preferences.
4.3.2 Annuities and consumption ﬁnancing.
The second set of results we present relies on the role of annuities in consumption smoothing in
the case when individuals have access to a perfect credit market. More precisely, at any age t we
break down the agent’s consumption into three components reﬂecting the respective role of public
annuities, riskless savings and private annuities. Indeed, the budget constraint imposes that:







which means that consumption at age t is ﬁnanced through public annuities y, the decumulation of
riskless savings (1+R)bt−1 −bt and ﬁnally the decumulation of private annuities
Pt−1
k=0 ak −πtat.
In Table 2, we report the average shares of consumption ﬁnanced by public annuities, private
annuities and riskless saving. The average is computed over the agent’s lifetime and the survival
probabilities are taken into account. The main diﬀerence lies in the fact that while the additive
model predicts that consumption should be fully ﬁnanced out of (private or public) annuities, the
multiplicative model predicts that more than a third of consumption should be ﬁnanced by riskless
savings. This ﬁnding is consistent with empirical studies, such as Johnson, Burman, and Kobes
(2004), who report that in 1999, one third of the consumption of US people older than 65 was
ﬁnanced by decumulation of their savings.




















































Structure of consumption financing (additive model)
 
 




























































Figure 1: Consumption ﬁnancing structure
In Figure 1, it is shown how consumption ﬁnancing varies with age. While in the additive
22model consumption is fully ﬁnanced by public and private annuities, we ﬁnd that in the multi-
plicative model, private annuities play a signiﬁcant role only after age 87. Individuals would then
ideally postpone their purchase of annuities, which would generate very serious problems of adverse
selection in a realistic environment.
Another striking feature of Figure 1 is the sharp decline in the fraction of consumption ﬁnanced
by riskless saving. Equation (33) shows that the plotted expression is equal to 1
ct [(1 + R)bt−1 − bt],
which means that it is basically minus the derivative of the stock of riskless savings. According
to Figure 2 hereafter, before age 87, this stock decreases almost linearly, and then it reaches zero
where it remains because of the assumed positivity constraint until the end (people rely then
on annuities and pension). In continuous time, the (opposite of the) derivative would simply be
discontinuous, and jump from a positive value to zero. Thus the “rapid decline” would be vertical.
In discrete time, this is not exactly vertical, as the derivatives takes two periods to stabilize to
zero, which explain the pattern in the fraction of consumption ﬁnanced by riskless saving.
4.3.3 Consumption smoothing and bequest proﬁles
The graphs of Figure 2 reproduce consumption and bequest proﬁles as a function of age. The
consumption proﬁles decline with age in both models, which is consistent with our calibration
choice of 5.00% for the rate of time discounting. This rate implies a decline in consumption at the
retirement age of approximately −0.10%. In the additive model, the decline remains constant over
time, while it is increasing in the multiplicative model. Such an increasing decline is reported in
many empirical studies investigating consumption proﬁles using micro-economic data (Fernández-
Villaverde and Krueger (2007) among others). The multiplicative model generates therefore more
realistic consumption data, as discussed in Bommier (2011).
The discounted bequest proﬁles obtained with each model are also diﬀerent. As underlined in
the theoretical section, in the additive model, the discounted bequest is constant, which means
that the present value of what the heir receives is independent of the agent’s life duration. The
multiplicative model provides a diﬀerent picture, with an amount of bequest that declines with the
age at death. The longer an agent lives, the smaller the bequest he leaves to his heirs. Although the
agent could fully insure the amount of wealth he leaves to his heirs, being lifetime risk averse makes
him choose a strategy that generates a negative correlation between life duration and bequest and
avoids him leaving low bequests when dying young. This ﬁnding is consistent with the many
empirical studies, such as Japelli (1999), that show that agents decumulate wealth as they grow
older.14
14The interpretation of empirical evidence on age speciﬁc wealth proﬁles should, however, be subject to caution.
Indeed, saving decumulation can also be obtained under the assumption of risk neutrality with respect to lifetime




















































Figure 2: Consumption and bequest proﬁles
4.4 Result robustness
In order to assess the validity of our statement, we check several aspects. First, we study the
sensitivity of our results to our calibration choices regarding the VSL, the rate of time discounting
and the intensity of bequest motives. Second, we consider other model speciﬁcations that can be
found in the literature on bequest.
Role of calibration over VSL and rate of time discounting. Our benchmark calibration
assumes that the VSL is worth 500 × c0, where c0 is the agent’s consumption at retirement age,
while the rate of time discounting is chosen to be equal to 5.00%. To check the sensitivity of our
results to these values, we simply rerun simulations for both the additive and the multiplicative
models using a wide range of calibrations.
First, the VSL is assumed to vary between 200 × c0 and 1000 × c0, while the rate of time
discounting remains unchanged. The impact of VSL is very small and the increase from 200 to 1000
retirement consumptions has no eﬀect on WTP in the additive model and barely diminishes it in the
multiplicative model (it goes from 1.26% to 1.20%). The consequence on consumption smoothing
is also practically negligible and the structure of consumption ﬁnancing is barely aﬀected. We do
not reproduce graphs here.
Second, we keep the VSL unchanged to 500 × c0 and the rate of time discounting varies from
4.00% to 6.00% (i.e., the yearly consumption rate of growth at 65 decreases from +0.38% to
felicity if annuities are not fairly priced.
24−0.53%). Results are plotted in Figure 3. As shown by the left-hand side graph, the WTP
decreases from 7.9% to 6.1% in the additive model and from 2.2% to 0.8% in the multiplicative
one. On the right-hand side graph, we observe that the rate of time discounting barely aﬀects the
structure of consumption ﬁnancing in the additive model. However, in the multiplicative model,
the share of private annuities substantially declines with the rate of time discounting (from approx.
18% to 3% of the consumption on average). Indeed, in the multiplicative model, time discounting
is generated by mortality and lifetime risk aversion. A greater rate of time discounting indicates
that agents are in fact more risk averse. They are then more reluctant to purchase annuities, as
annuities increase the risk on lifetime utility.










Role of the rate of time discounting on willingness−to−pay
to access a private annuity market
































Role of the rate of time discounting on the share
of private annuities in consumption financing






























































Figure 3: Impact of the rate of time discounting on willingness-to-pay for private annuity and the
structure of consumption ﬁnancing
Role of public annuities. In the benchmark calibration, we assumed that the present value
of public annuities y was equal to the non-annuity wealth W0. We now study the impact on our
results of the share of public annuities in total wealth, which we make vary from 0 to 60%. Results
are plotted in Figure 4.
The pattern for WTP displayed on the left-hand side graph of Figure 4 is not surprising since
it simply reveals a substitution between public and private annuities. The larger the share of
public annuities in total wealth, the less the need for private annuities and thus the smaller the
willingness-to-pay. This eﬀect is present and its magnitude is similar for both models.
The impact of public annuities on ﬁnancing of consumption is plotted in the right-hand side
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Role of public annuity on the share
of private annuities in consumption financing






























































Figure 4: Impact of public annuity on willingness-to-pay for private annuity and on consumption
ﬁnancing
graph of Figure 4. Whenever there is a positive demand for private annuities, public annuities
mechanically substitute for private annuities. As the additive model always predicts a positive
demand for private annuities, this simple substitution eﬀect is always at play. Public annuity
simply crowds out private annuity. With the multiplicative model, the story could be a bit more
complex, as the demand for private annuity may become null at some ages. But overall, this has
an impact only for high levels of public annuities, and we mainly observe the same crowding out
eﬀect as in the additive case.
Role of bequest motives intensity. We now explore the robustness of our ﬁndings in relation
to the speciﬁcation of bequest motives. We will discuss how changing the intensity of bequest
motives (parameter θ) may impact our results. The benchmark calibration corresponds to an
average bequest of 20% of the initial non-annuitized wealth. Graphs in Figure 5 plot our results
as a function of the average bequest.
First, the left-hand side graph illustrates the impact of bequest motives on the WTPs. As
soon as the intensity of the bequest motive becomes signiﬁcant (average bequest greater than 1%
of the non-annuitized wealth), the multiplicative model generates smaller WTP than the additive
one. Second, the WTPs decrease with the average bequest: the stronger the bequest motive, the
more the agent needs to save, the less he cares about annuity. The decrease is stronger for the
multiplicative model in which lifetime risk aversion ampliﬁes the bequest motive. When the average
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of private annuities in consumption financing





































Figure 5: Impact of the bequest motive on willingness-to-pay for private annuity and on consump-
tion ﬁnancing
bequest increases, the WTP decreases more rapidly with the multiplicative model than with the
additive one. With the multiplicative model, WTP will be below 5% as soon as the average bequest
becomes greater than 8% of the non-annuitized wealth. WTP in the additive model becomes below
5% only when the average bequest motive is greater than 35% of initial wealth.
Second, the right-hand side graph of Figure 5 plots the share of private annuities in the ﬁ-
nancing of consumption. In both models, the share of consumption ﬁnanced by private annuities
decreases with the bequest motive. A stronger bequest motive modiﬁes the agent’s trade-oﬀ be-
tween consumption and bequest. As the agent consumes less, the constant annuity y thus ﬁnances
a greater proportion of the agent’s consumption and crowds out private annuities. In the multi-
plicative case, the decline in the share of consumption ﬁnanced by private annuities is greater than
in the additive model. For very strong bequest motives (providing an average bequest of 30% of
the non-annuitized wealth and more), the share of private annuities is close to zero, while in the
additive model this share never goes below one third.
Alternative bequest speciﬁcations. As highlighted in Lockwood (2011), most functional
forms used in the literature to model bequest motives are nested in our parametrization of v
in Equation (28). However, there is no consensus about how bequests respond to wealth, which
depends on the combination of parameters ψ and θ that enter into equation (28). Diﬀerent combi-
nations of θ and ψ provide diﬀerent average bequests and diﬀerent responsiveness levels to changes
in wealth. So far, we have not discussed how bequests respond to wealth, since the question we
27address does not require consideration for heterogeneity in wealth. However, to check that our
results do not rely on an implausible wealth elasticity of bequests, we will consider speciﬁcations
that generate, for a given average bequest, the same wealth elasticities of bequest as in De Nardi
(2004), De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), Ameriks et al. (2011) and Lockwood (2011).
In practice, in order to obtain various additive reference speciﬁcations, we consider pairs of
parameters (θ,ψ) that are directly taken from each of the four above mentioned studies.15 The
other parameters such as elasticities of substitution, the rate of time discounting, mortality rates
and rate of interest are set as before (Table 1). The ratio of non-annuitized wealth over total
wealth is also held constant at one half. In each case, we adjust the initial wealth level W0, so
as to obtain the same average bequest equal to 20% of the initial wealth, as in our benchmark
calibration. The four additive speciﬁcations that we consider diﬀer because they assume diﬀerent
wealth elasticities of bequest. In order to illustrate the role of lifetime risk aversion, each of these
additive speciﬁcations are compared with a corresponding multiplicative model that generates the
same amount of average bequests and the same rate of time discounting at age 65. This is done
by adjusting the parameters λ (lifetime risk aversion) and θ (intensity of the bequest motives), the
other parameters being kept as in the additive speciﬁcations. In each case, the constant u0 is set
to generate a VSL equaling 500 yearly consumptions at age 65.
We report in Table 3 the WTP for private annuities, and how consumption is ﬁnanced for each
speciﬁcation. Table 3, is similar to Table 2, except that instead of using our own calibration for
the bequest motive, we now rely on speciﬁcations taken from other studies. Exact calibrations can
be found in Section C of the Appendix.
Calibration DeNardi DeNardi et al. Ameriks et al. Lockwood
Model Mult. Add. Mult. Add. Mult. Add. Mult. Add.
Willingness-to-pay (%) 1.81 3.76 1.35 6.69 1.75 4.22 1.56 5.50
Share of consumption ﬁnanced by:
Public annuities 56.07 55.56 56.24 55.55 56.13 55.55 56.24 55.56
Private annuities 2.61 44.44 8.96 44.45 2.59 44.45 2.71 44.44
Riskless saving 41.32 0.00 34.79 0.00 41.29 0.00 41.05 0.00
Table 3: Impact of various calibrations for the bequest preferences when the bequest motive is
20% of the non-annuitized wealth
Looking at the additive speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that the WTP for gaining access to annuity ranges
from 3.76% to 6.69% of the initial wealth W0. This reﬂects the heterogeneity in assumptions that
15More precisely, Lockwood (2011) converted the three other model estimations (in addition to his own one) into
a common functional form and we in turn adapt his parameters to our functional form (28).
28can be found in the literature as to the precise form of the bequest motive. In all cases annuities
ﬁnance about 44% of consumption, the remaining being ﬁnanced by public annuities.
As previously, the results obtained when introducing lifetime risk aversion strongly contrast
with those of the additive speciﬁcations. First, the WTP for annuities, though still positive, is
much smaller, ranging from 1.35% to 1.81% of initial wealth W0. Second, when available, private
annuities are used much less. Looking at the diﬀerent multiplicative speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that
35% to 41% of consumption is ﬁnanced by riskless savings, while private annuities are only used to
ﬁnance from 2.6% to 9% of private consumption. Independent from any market failure, the size of
the annuity market is thus found to be much smaller when agents have multiplicative preferences
than when they have additive preferences. This result holds for a wide range of bequest motives.
5 Conclusion
The relationship between risk aversion and annuity demand has remained unexplored in the eco-
nomics literature. However, as soon as we account for risk aversion in a proper way (that is by
considering lifetime risk aversion), the demand for annuities is found to decrease with risk aversion.
Moreover, annuity demand eventually becomes negative (or vanishes if we add a positivity con-
straint) if lifetime risk aversion is suﬃciently large and individuals have a positive bequest motive.
A possible reason for the observed low level of wealth annuitization may therefore simply be that
individuals are too risk averse to purchase annuities. Intuitively they do not purchase annuities
because they do not want to take the risk of dying young without leaving a bequest, which is
indeed the worst scenario one can imagine.
Calibration of our model with realistic mortality patterns and preference parameters that seem
reasonable indicate that lifetime risk aversion contributes towards explaining the annuity puzzle as
it generates signiﬁcantly lower levels of willingness-to-pay for annuities. Nonetheless, reasonable
parameter values did not generate a negative demand for annuity. Our calibration suggest that
risk aversion alone cannot solve the annuity puzzle. Other elements such as the existence of public
pensions, market imperfections, the need for liquidities and rationality biases should be also be
taken into account in order to end up with a negative demand for annuities. By introducing lifetime
risk aversion in the discussion, we add one more piece to the annuity puzzle complementing the
other possible explanations suggested so far.
Interestingly enough, corroboration for our theoretical explanation comes from the literature
exploring behavioral biases. Indeed, as we discussed previously, several papers including Brown,
Kling, Mullainathan and Wrobel (2008), Hu and Scott (2007), Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach and
Szykman (2008) and Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011), provide convincing evidence that
29the riskiness of annuities was considered to be a major source of concern for agents. Taking this
further Brown (2007) points out that people apparently want to buy insurance contracts when
utility is low. Our contribution involves showing that this behavioral trait can be reconciled with a
standard model of choice under uncertainty (expected utility) when lifetime risk aversion is taken
into account. When lifetime risk aversion is signiﬁcant enough, the state associated with lower
utility is also the one with higher marginal utility. The willingness to buy contracts that pay
when utility is low is then consistent with rational insurance behavior, which involves purchasing
contracts that pay oﬀ when the marginal utility is high.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
When φ is linear, φ
0(UA) = φ
0(UD) = φ
0(0) = 1. First order conditions (8)–(10) and the budget






(= if a > 0), (34)











2(c2) (= if s > 0), (35)
v0(τ) ≤ u0
2(c2) (= if τ > 0), (36)




Let us show that in any case (1 + R)s = τ.
1. s = 0. The budget constraint (37) implies that a > 0: (34) is therefore an equality. (35)
implies then that v0(0) ≤ u0
2(c2). Suppose that τ > 0: we deduce from (36) that v0(0) ≤ v0(τ),
which contradicts that v is concave and non-linear. Thus, (1 + R)s = τ = 0.
2. s > 0. From (35), which is an equality, together with (34) and (36), we deduce that v0((1 +
R)s) ≥ u0
2(c2) ≥ v0(τ) and τ ≥ (1+R)s > 0. The budget constraint (37) implies that a > 0.
(34), as (35) and (36) are therefore equalities: we deduce that v0((1 + R)s) = v0(τ) and
(1 + R)s = τ.
We always obtain (1 + R)s = τ, and thus also a =
pc2
1+R.
B Proof of Proposition 3
First, we show that if λ is large enough then a = 0. Let us assume that for all λ, a > 0 and see
that we obtain a contradiction. When a is interior, the FOC together with the budget constraint
can be rewritten:

pe−λUA + (1 − p)e−λUD)

u0














W0 = c1 +
p(c2 + τ)
1 + R
+ s(1 − p) (42)
35Because of the possible existence of corner solutions for s and τ we have to consider several
cases. We will see that in all possible cases we end up having a contradiction.














= (1 + R)u0
2(c2) ≥ (1 + R)v0(0)eλu2(c2) (43)
Suppose c2 < c∗
2. The inequality (43) implies, since u(c2) < 0 and p + (1 − p)eλu2(c2) < 1:
u0
1(c1) > (1 + R)u0
2(c2) (44)
For c∗
2, we derive from Assumption A and c∗
2 ≥ c∗∗































Inequalities (44) and (45) are incompatible, and we deduce c2 ≥ c∗
2 and u2(c2) ≥ 0.
We deduce from (43) that u0
2(c2) ≥ v0(0). We also have:
v0(0) ≤
h




















Suppose that c2 < c∗∗
2 . Under Assumption A:
v0(0) ≥ v0(c∗∗
































. We deduce that c2 ≥ c∗∗
2 .
The optimal second period consumption exists if there exists a solution ≥ c∗∗
2 to the following
equation:










The LHS is an increasing function of c2, while the RHS is a decreasing one. A solution exists
if and only if p+(1−p)eλu2(c
∗∗














2 ) > 0, we can always ﬁnd
a λ such that the optimum does not exist. For the optimum to exist, we thus necessarily
have: c∗
2 = c∗∗
2 = 0 and u2(0) = 0.
Let A > 0 be arbitrarily large. Since limc2→0 u0
2(c2) = +∞, it is always possible to choose




















2) is greater than 1, but also smaller than 2 in the vicinity of 0. Indeed, by l’Hospital’s







2), which is smaller than 2 because u2 is increasing and
concave.
We can now always choose λ ≥ 0 such that:









 > p + (1 − p)e
λu2(
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2) > p + (1 − p)eA (46)
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Eq. (46) means that c2 exists and ε



























The RHS can be made arbitrarily close to (1 − p)u0
1 (W0), by choosing A large and ε small
enough. We therefore have v0(0), which can be strictly smaller than u0
1 (W0), which contra-
dicts Assumption A.
As a result, we cannot have s = τ = 0.
2. Assume that τ > 0 and s = 0. Eq. (41) is an equality and we deduce from (39)–(41):
u0
2(c2) = v0(τ) ≥ v0(0)eλ(UA−UD),
which implies UA − UD = u2(c2) + v(τ) < 0, and c2 ≤ c∗
2 ≤ c∗∗




2 ) > v0(0) ≥ v0(τ)
This contradicts u0
2(c2) = v0(τ). We cannot have τ > 0 = s.
373. Assume that s > 0 and τ = 0. Eq. (40) is an equality and we deduce from (38)–(41):
u0
2(c2) = v0((1 + R)s)eλ(UA−UD) =





1(c1) ≥ v0(0) (47)
This implies that UA − UD = u2(c2) − v((1 + R)s) > 0. We deduce from the preceding
inequality and from the budget constraint stating that c1 = W0−
pc2



















2 ≥ c2. From the budget constraint c2 = (1 + R)s + a1+R
p ≥ (1 + R)s. From
(47) and c∗∗
2 ≥ (1 + R)s, we deduce that v0(c∗∗
2 ) ≤ v0((1 + R)s) ≤ 1
1+Ru0
1(c1). Moreover,
c1 = W0 −
pc2












1+R. We therefore deduce that
v0(c∗∗






1+R), which contradicts Assumption A. We thus have c2 ≥ c∗∗
2 .




First case. The function c2 7→ u2(c2) − v(h(c2)) is increasing. c2 is deﬁned as:










Using the same proof strategy as in the case s = τ = 0, we ﬁrst obtain c∗∗
2 = c∗
2 = 0 and then
obtain a contradiction with Assumption A.
Second case. The function c2 7→ u2(c2) − v(h(c2)) is decreasing (in the vicinity of c∗∗
2 –
otherwise, the previous argument applies). First remark that it imposes c∗∗
2 > 0. Otherwise,
we have for all c2 ≥ 0 suﬃciently small: h0(c2)v0(h(c2)) ≥ u0(c2). After integration (u2(c∗∗
2 ) =
u2(c∗
2) = 0), we get a contradiction with u2(c2) − v(h(c2)) ≥ 0.
c2 is still deﬁned as:










u2(c2) − v(h(c2)) = (u2(c2) − v(c2)) + (v(c2) − v(h(c2))) is the sum of two positive terms
(since c2 ≥ (1 + R)s) and is strictly positive id c2 > c∗∗
2 . If v(c∗∗
2 ) − v(h(c∗∗
2 )) is strictly
positive, it is suﬃcient to chose λ large enough to get a contradiction (c2 never exists – choose
λ > minc2≥c∗∗
2 (u2(c2) − v(h(c2)))

















2 ) = v(h(c∗∗
2 )).
38c2 7→ u2(c2) − v(h(c2)) is decreasing in the vicinity of c∗∗
2 , but positive. This implies that
u2(c2) = v(h(c2)) in the vicinity of c∗∗
2 , which contradicts the deﬁnition of c∗∗
2 .
4. Assume that s > 0 and τ > 0.
In that case:









Suppose that c2 < c∗∗
2 . We then have: u0(c∗∗
2 ) < u0(c2) = v0(τ) ≤ v0(0), which contradicts
Assumption A. We therefore have c2 ≥ c∗∗
2 ≥ c∗
2.
The budget constraint gives c2 + τ = (1 + R)s + (1 + R)a/p > (1 + R)s. We deduce
v(c2) + v(τ) ≥ v((1 + R)s) (v being concave with v(0) = 0 is subadditive. For all λ ∈ [0,1],
v(λc) = v(λc+(1−λ)0) ≥ λv(c)+(1−λ)v(0) = λv(c). Then v(c2)+v(τ) = v((c2+τ) c2
c2+τ )+
v((c2 + τ) τ
c2+τ ) ≥ v(c2 + τ) ≥ v((1 + R)s)).
We have UA−UD = u(c2)+v(τ)−v((1+R)s) = (u2(c2) − v(c2))+(v(c2) + v(τ) − v((1 + R)s)) ≥
0 since both terms are positive due to our preceding remark and c2 ≥ c∗∗
2 .
We deduce that v0(τ) ≥ v0((1 + R)s) and (1 + R)s ≥ τ.
As previously, it is straightforward that τ and (1 + R)s are increasing functions of c2 that
we denote respectively ψ(c2) and h(c2). c2 solves:










The proof is now similar to that in 3) and we again obtain a contradiction.
We have shown that if λ is large enough, then a = 0. We now prove that an increase in lifetime
risk aversion λ implies a smaller annuity demand a. Due to possible corner solutions, we distinguish
several cases.






p + (1 − p)eλ(UA−UD)

u0
1(c1) = v0((1 + R)s)eλ(UA−UD) = v0(τ)
W0 = c1 +
p(c2 + τ)
1 + R
+ (1 − p)s
W0 = c1 + s + a
c2 + τ = (1 + R)s + (1 + R)
a
p
We have c2 ≥ c∗∗
2 .
39We assume an increase of λ starting from an optimum where c1,c2,τ,a,s > 0. For the sake






































































We drop arguments and to limit ambiguity, we note v00




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































which means that ∂c2
∂λ < 0 and ∂S
∂λ > 0.
For a, we have:










































We ﬁnally have ∂a
∂λ < 0.
412. We assume that s,a > 0, and τ = 0. Previous equations are still valid, but with Γ = 1. We
also obtain that ∂a
∂λ < 0.
Moreover the condition for non interior τ is v0(0) ≤ u0(c2) remains true for a small increase
in λ since ∂c2
∂λ < 0.
3. We assume that τ = s = 0 and a > 0. We have:
h









= (1 + R)u0
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1 u2
It is straightforward that ∂c2
∂λ < 0 and from c2 = (1 + R)a/p, we deduce that ∂a
∂λ < 0
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We deﬁne Λ as:
Λ = pu00
2 + (1 − p)v00
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S and τ ≥ S, which contradicts c2 = S − τ ≥ 0.



































S) is positive, the result is true. If it is negative, we
divide the previous inequality by the deﬁnition (49) of ∂c2
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Seλ∆U
p + (1 − p)eλ∆U u0
1
This relationship is always true since the LHS is negative, while the RHS is positive. Indeed,
we know that u0
2 ≤ v0




435. The case of a = τ = 0 < s is the same as the previous one with Γ = 1.
C Calibrations for alternative bequest speciﬁcations
We provide here calibrations for measuring the impact of the alternative bequest speciﬁcations.
All calibrations generate a value of average bequest of 20% of the non-annuitized wealth W0 and
a rate of time discounting of 4.80%. The value of a statistical life is 500 consumptions at 65.
In all cases, the following parameters are ﬁxed:
Parameters σ ψ R
Values 2.0 1.0 3.00%
Calibrations lie in the following table:
Lockwood (2010)
Multiplicative model Linear model
Exogenous Parameters







u0 1.018 u0 1.77
λ 0.071 β 1
1+3%
θ 2.71 × 10−3 θ 3.05 × 10−3
De Nardi, French and Jones (2010)
Multiplicative model Linear model
Exogenous Parameters







u0 0.355 u0 0.69
λ 0.204 β 1
1+3%
θ 4.04 × 10−4 θ 4.27 × 10−4
De Nardi (2004)
Multiplicative model Linear model
Exogenous Parameters







u0 0.75 u0 1.43
λ 0.096 β 1
1+3%
θ 1.17 × 10−3 θ 1.37 × 10−3
Ameriks et al. (2011)
Multiplicative model Linear model
Exogenous Parameters







u0 3.74 u0 7.15
λ 0.019 β 1
1+3%
θ 0.031 θ 0.036
Table 4: Calibrations for alternative bequest motives
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